Battle of Longewala
|Battle of Longewala|
|Part of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971|
Tank tracks at Longewala. Photographic reconnaissance image taken at the time showing the desperate last minute maneuveres by Pakistani tanks in the Longewala sector. Circles show destroyed Pakistani tanks.
|A Coy, 23 Bn Punjab Regiment, Indian army
No 122(ad-hoc) Squadron, Indian Air Force
|51st Infantry Brigade, Pakistan Army|
|Major Kuldip Singh Chandpuri
Wg Cdr M.S. Bawa
|Brigadier Tariq Mir|
2 Recoilless rifles
, one HAL Krishak light observation aircraft, 4 Hawker Hunters
43 T-59 and 12 M-4 Sherman tanks
5 Field guns
3 Anti-aircraft guns
138 Military vehicles
|Casualties and losses|
|2 men, 1 jeep mounted recoiless rifles||200 soldiers. 34 tanks destroyed, or abandoned; 50 APCs and vehicles damaged and abandoned.|
The Battle of Longewala (December 4, 1971 – December 5, 1971) was one of the first major engagements in the Western Sector during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, fought between assaulting Pakistani forces and Indian defenders at the Indian border post of Longewala, in the Thar Desert of the Rajasthan state in India.
The Indian infantry company (reinforced) was left with the choices of either attempting to hold out until reinforced, or fleeing on foot from a mechanised infantry Pakistani force, choosing the former. The company officer commanding ensured that all his assets were correctly employed, and made the most use of his strong defensive position, and weaknesses created by errors in enemy tactics. He was also fortunate in that an Indian Air Force forward air controller was able to secure and direct aircraft in support of the post’s defence until reinforcements arrived six hours later.
The Pakistani commanders made several bad decisions, including failure of strategic intelligence to foresee availability of Indian strike aircraft in the Longewala area, exercising operational mobility with little or no route reconnaissance, and conducting a tactical frontal assault with no engineer reconnaissance. This led to the Pakistani brigade group being left extremely vulnerable to air attack, vehicles becoming bogged in ground surface not suitable for movement of armoured vehicles as they tried to deploy off a single track, these being more susceptible to enemy fire by using external fuel storage in tactical combat, attempting to execute a night attack over unfamiliar terrain, and infantry being surprised by obstacles to troop movement causing confusion and stalling the attack during the crucial hours of darkness when the assaulting infantry still had a measure of concealment from Indian small arms and infantry support weapons fire.
The main thrust of the Indian Army‘s might during the 1971 war was directed towards the eastern theatre, with the western sector envisaged as a holding operation to prevent the Pakistan Army from achieving any success that would allow Yahya Khan any bargaining tool to trade against the captured territories in the east. By the last week of November 1971, the Indian Army had launched offensive manouvres at Atgram against Pakistani border posts and communications centres along the eastern border. The Mukti Bahini also launched an offensive on Jessore at this time. It was clear to Islamabad by this time that open conflict was inevitable, and that East Pakistan was indefensible in the long run. Yahya Khan chose at this point to try to protect Pakistan’s integrity and to hold India by Ayub Khan‘s strategy – “The defence of East Pakistan lies in the West”.
The Western sector
Khan’s policy made the assumption that an open conflict with India would not last long due to International pressure, and that since East Pakistan was undefendable, the war-effort should be concentrated on occupying as large an area of Indian territory as possible as a bargaining tool at the negotiating table. To this end, Gen Tikka Khan had proposed an offensive into India, and the PAF’s “overriding priority was to give maximum support to this offensive”. The initial plans for the offensive called for at least a temporary cover of air dominance by the PAF under which Khan’s troops could conduct a lightning campaign deep into Western India before digging in and consolidating their positions. To support Khan’s troops, the PAF had launched pre-emptive strikes on the evening of 3rd December that led to the formal commencement of hostilities. In the western theatre, the town of Rahimyar Khan, close to the international border, formed a critical communication centre for Khan’s forces and, situated on the Sindh – Punjab railway, remained a vulnerable link on Khan’s logistics. The fall of Rahimyar Khan to Indian forces would cut off the rail as well as road link between Sindh and Punjab, starving Khan’s forces of fuel and ammunitions delivered to Karachi.
Indian battle plans called for a strike across the international border with 12 Indian divisions towards Islamgarh through Sarkari Tala, subsequently advancing through Baghla to secure Rahimyar Khan, which would not only destabilise the Pakistani defences in the Punjab, but also in the Jammu & Kashmir Sector, allowing the planned Indian offensive in the Shakargarh sector to sweep the Pakistani forces trapped there.
Pakistan, which envisaged the Punjab as an operational centre, had a strong intelligence network in the area and planned to counter its own comparatively weak strength on the ground with a pre-emptive strike through Kishangarh towards the divisional headquarters south of Ramgarh Pakistani intelligence did a very good job infiltrating the operations area posing as local people and passing on information. However, these sources failed to pass on information on the Longewala post which, originally a BSF post, was now held by a company of the Punjab Regiment. Longewala formed a strategic point en route to capturing vast tracts of land and also a pivotal theatre of war in engaging India on the western front.
Pakistan’s tactical plan was based on the assumption that an attack in the area would help Pakistan’s 1st Armoured Divisions task in the Sri Ganganagar area. Pakistan High command also felt that it was important to protect the North-South road link which they felt was vulnerable as it was close to the border. A Combined Operations Plan was decided upon. This involved two Infantry Brigades and two Armoured Regiments. A separate division, the 18 Division, was formed for this purpose. 18 Division Operation Orders required one Infantry Brigade (206) with an Armoured Regiment (38 Cavalry) to capture and establish a firm base at Longewala, a junction on the Indian road system and 51st Infantry Brigade and the 22nd Armoured Regiment to operate beyond Longewala to capture Jaisalmer.
The Pakistani plan was to reach Longewala, Ramgarh and Jaisalmer“. The plan was far-fetched from the start, if only because it called for a night attack to be conducted over terrain that was not preceded by route or engineer reconnaissance, and the armoured troops were therefore unaware of the ground surface that could not support rapid movement towards the objective. As the day unfolded, Longewala would stand out as one of the biggest losses in a battle for Pakistan despite overwhelming superiority before commencement of the battle, largely due to the vehicles becoming bogged down in soft sand.
Indian defensive planning
On the Indian side, the Longewala post was held by the A company of the 23rd Battalion, Punjab Regiment, led by Major K S Chandpuri, the defences occupying a high sand dune which dominated the area that was largely intractable to vehicles. The post was surrounded by a barbed wire fence of three stands. The rest of the battalion was located at Sadhewala, 17 km north-east of the Longewala post. Chandpuri commanded an infantry company reinforced by a section each of MMGs and L16 81mm Mortar, and one Jeep-mounted RCL. His two other recoilless rifle teams of the anti-tank section were under training at the battalion headquarters. Major Chandpuri also had under his command a four-man team of the camel Border Security Force division. The Longewala post had no armoured vehicles, but artillery support was available from a battery of 170 Field Regiment (Veer Rajput) tasked in direct support to the battalion, and 168 Field Regiment which had been deployed to the area in secrecy just a day earlier. The direct support battery was attached to the 168 Field Regiment and served as its “Sierra” Battery. Immediately after PAF strikes on Indian airfields on December 3, Chandpuri dispatched a 20 man strong patrol under Lieutenant Dharam Veer to Boundary Pillar (BP) 638, erected right on the international border. This patrol was to play an important part in detecting the Pakistani forces.
During the night of the the 4th, Lt. Veer’s platoon conducting a patrol detected noises across the border that suggested a large number of armoured vehicles approaching. These were soon confirmed by reports from the Air Force observation aircraft in the area of a 20km long armoured column on the track leading to the post advancing in the general direction of the Longewala post. Directing Lt Veer’s patrol to trail the advancing armoured column, Chandpuri got in touch with the battalion headquarters requesting urgent reinforcements and armour and artillery support. Battalion HQ gave him the choice of staying put, and containing the attack as much as possible, or carrying out a tactical retreat of the company to Ramgarh, as reinforcements would not be available for at least six hours. Considering that Chandpuri’s command had no transportation, and was facing a mobile enemy, he decided to maintain the defensive position of the post where his troops at least had the benefit of prepared defensive works, rather than conducting a withdrawal at night that was a far more riskier option.
The Pakistani forces begun their attack at 12:30 am. As the offensive approached the lone outpost, Pakistani artillery opened up across the border with medium artillery guns, killing five of the ten camels from the BSF detachment. As the column of 65 tanks neared the post, Indian defences, lacking the time to lay a prepared minefield, laid a hasty anti-tank minefield as the enemy advanced, one infantryman being killed in the process. The Indian infantry held fire until the leading Pakistani tanks had approached to 15-30 metres before firing their PIATs. They accounted for the first two tanks on the track with their Jeep-mounted 106mm M40 recoilless rifle, with one of its crew being killed during the combat. This weapon proved quite effective because it was able to engage the thinner top armour of the Pakistani tanks from its elevated position, firing at often stationary bogged down vehicles. In all the post defenders claimed 12 tanks destroyed or damaged. The initial Pakistani attack stalled almost immediately when the infantry discovered the barbed wire which was unseen in the night, and interpreted it to signify a minefield. Firing for the Indian RCL crews was made easier by the flames of fires when the spare fuel tanks on the Pakistani tanks, intended to supplement their internal capacity for the advance to Jaisalmer, exploded, at once providing ample light for Indians located on higher ground, and creating a dense acrid smoke screen at ground level for the Pakistani infantry, adding to the confusion. Two hours were lost as Pakistani sappers were brought up, only to discover there was no minefield. However at this time Pakistani infantry were required to make another attack, from a different direction, but in the dawn light. The Pakistani advance then attempted to surround the post two hours later by vehicles getting off the road, but many vehicles, particularly armoured personnel carriers and tanks, in trying to soften up the Indian defenders before attacking, became bogged in the soft sand of the area surrounding the post. Throughout the engagement Major Chandpuri continued to direct the supporting artillery fire.
Although massively outnumbering the Indian defenders, and having surrounded them, the Pakistani troops were unable to advance over open terrain on a full-moon night, under small arms and mortar fire from the outpost. This encouraged the Indians not to give up their strong defensive position, frustrating the Pakistani commanders. As dawn arrived, the Pakistan forces had still not taken the post, and were now having to do so in full daylight.
In the morning the Indian Air Force was finally able to direct some HF-24 Maruts and Hawker Hunter aircraft to assist the post; they were not outfitted with night vision equipment, and so were delayed from conducting combat missions until dawn. With daylight, however, the IAF was able to operate effectively, with the strike aircraft being guided to the targets by the airborne Forward Air Controller (FAC) Major Atma Singh in a HAL Krishak. The Indian aircraft attacked the Pakistani ground troops with the 16 Matra T-10 rockets and 30 mm cannon fire on each aircraft. Without support from the Pakistan Air Force, which was busy elsewhere, the tanks and other armoured vehicles were easy targets for the IAF’s Hunters. The range of the 12.7mm anti-aircraft heavy machine guns mounted on the tanks was limited and therefore ineffective against the Indian jets. Indian air attacks were made easier by the nature of the barren terrain. By noon the next day, the assault ended completely, having cost Pakistan 22 tanks claimed destroyed by aircraft fire, 12 by ground anti-tank fire, and some captured after being abandoned, with a total of 100 vehicles claimed to have been destroyed or damaged in the desert around the post. The Pakistani attack was first halted, and then Pakistani forces were forced to withdraw when AMX-13 Indian tanks from division’s cavalry regiment, and the 17th Rajputana Rifles launched their counter-offensive to end the six-hour combat; Longewala had proved to be one of the defining moments in the war.
Notwithstanding the Indian victory, there were intelligence and strategic failures on both sides. India’s intelligence failed to provide warning of such a large armoured force in the western sector. Moreover the defending post was not heavily armed to neutralise the enemy. Finally, they didn’t push home the advantage by finishing more tanks when the IAF had the Pakistan tanks on the run. They did, however destroy or capture some 40 tanks, remaining one of the largest disproportionate tank casualties for one side in a single battle after WWII.
Invading Pakistan troops meanwhile, had over-estimated the Longewala post’s defensive capability due to the difficulty of approach over sand, conducting the attack at night and in full-moon light, against stiff resistance encountered there from a well prepared defensive position located on a dominant height. Attacking with virtually no air cover, they took long to close for an assault on the position, and failed to anticipate availability of Indian close air support. Given that Pakistan’s Sherman tanks and T-59/Type 59 Chinese T-55 copies were slow on the sandy Thar desert, some military analysts[who?] have opined that the attack may have been a poorly planned and executed given the terrain. Some Pakistan tanks had suffered engine failures due to overheating in trying to extricate themselves, and were abandoned. The open desert battleground provided little to no cover for the tanks and infantry from air attacks. The plan to capture Longewala may have been good in conception, but failed due to lack of air cover.
For his part, the Indian company commander Major (later Brigadier) Kuldip Singh Chandpuri was decorated with India’s second highest gallantry award, the Maha Vir Chakra. Several other awards were earned by members of the defending company, and the battalion’s commander. On the other hand, the Pakistani divisional commander was dismissed from service. However, the commander of the Pakistani 51 Brigade who mounted the daring attack and crossed into Indian territory was later awarded Pakistan’s high award of the Sitara-e-Imtiaz.
A significant tribute was paid by the British media to the defenders of Longewala by James Hatter who described the Battle of Longewala as equivalent to Battle of Thermopylae in his article ‘TAKING ON THE ENEMY AT LONGEWALA’ described it as the deciding moment of the 1971 war. Similarly Chief of the Imperial General Staff Field Marshall RM Carver visited Longewala a few weeks after the war to learn from Chandpuri as to how 120 men overcome all odds against a tank battalion & infantry column of the Pakistan army.
There has been some doubt about the story of valor by Major K. S. Chandpuri and his team. Statements by retired major generals stated that the ground battle was a fake and the Indian army had only rehearsed it on a sand model after the ceasefire to cover up the incompetence of senior military commanders. In recent times this was a part of journalistic investigation.
Battle of Longewala in Popular Culture
The Battle of Longewala was depicted in the 1997 Hindi film Border, which was directed by J.P. Dutta and starred Sunny Deol as the Sikh Major Chandpuri, Jackie Shroff as the Wing Commander M.S. Bawa, Sunil Shetty as the Rajput Border Security Force Captain Bhairon Singh, and the then teen idol Akshaye Khanna as Lt. Dharam Veer Bhan. The movie largely sought to instil the need for closer ties between Sikhs and Hindus, and common defence against Muslim Pakistan, but with conciliatory overtones, particularly through the theme song “Mere Dushman, Mere Bhai” (My Enemy, My Brother). The main criticism of the movie was that it showed Indian forces being in a terrible position before any sort of help came from the Indian Air Force. This was not the case in the real incident as Indian forces had defended a position on a height that commanded the area, and were able to defend it effectively due to tactical mistakes made by the Pakistani commanders. This resulted in only 3 jawans casualties before combat ceased. Indian troops were later able to capture damaged or abandoned Pakistani tanks.